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We empirically analyze the welfare effects of cross-firm bundling in the pharmaceutical industry.
Physicians often treat patients with "cocktail" regimens that combine two or more drugs. Firms cannot
price discriminate because each drug is produced by a different firm and a physician creates the bundle
in her office from the component drugs. We show that a less competitive equilibrium arises with cocktail
products because firms can internalize partially the externality their pricing decisions impose on competitors.
The incremental profits from creating a bundle are sometimes as large as the incremental profits from
a merger of the same two firms.
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In the pharmaceutical market patients often take a combination of two or more drugs in order to
improve the e¢ cacy of treating a disease or alleviate side e⁄ects. Most HIV/AIDS patients, for
example, receive a "cocktail" regimen, such as efavirenz, lamivudine, and zidovudine. Three of
the six new cholesterol-reducing drugs entering phase 3 clinical trials in 2007 were combinations
of drugs that had already been approved as stand-alone products to treat the disease (Blume-
Kohout and Sood, 2008). In 2008, thirty-one percent of U.S. colorectal cancer patients receiving
chemotherapy treatment were administered cocktail regimens. A pharmaceutical cocktail must be
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by demonstrating superior e¢ cacy, fewer
side e⁄ects, or greater convenience relative to existing drugs, even if the cocktail is a combination
of already-approved drugs. Thus, cocktails compete with stand-alone regimens.
In this paper we analyze empirically the welfare e⁄ects of cross-￿rm bundling for pharma-
ceutical treatment of cancer patients where each cocktail consists of drugs made by di⁄erent ￿rms,
and each drug is also o⁄ered as a stand-alone product. In this market a ￿rm is constrained to set
the same price (i.e., a price per milligram of active ingredient) for both its stand-alone product
as well as its component of a cocktail product. This pricing constraint exists because oncologists
purchase the component drugs from di⁄erent manufacturers and then infuse the regimen into a pa-
tient in an o¢ ce or hospital clinic.1 This is an example of mixed bundling in an oligopoly market,
where there is demand for a bundle of products due to their complementarity but ￿rms cannot
price discriminate.
Firms often bundle or tie their own products for various reasons, and there is a substantial
economic literature analyzing this practice. Bundling may allow a ￿rm to engage in price discrim-
ination (McAfee and Whinston, 1989), to leverage monopoly power in one market by foreclosing
sales and discouraging entry in another market (Whinston, 1990; Chen, 1997; Carlton and Wald-
man, 2002; Nalebu⁄, 2004), or alter a pricing game among oligopolists even when entry is not
deterred or no ￿rms exit (Carlton, Gans, and Waldman, 2007). However, little is known about
price changes when a ￿rm￿ s product is bundled with those of its rival, and welfare e⁄ects of this
practice.
1Most HIV/AIDS patients, on the other hand, take a single pill that contains two or more separate drugs, which
allows ￿rms to price discriminate.
2Firms entering the oncology market often test their experimental drug in combination with
a drug that is already approved. The entering ￿rm can purchase the approved product without
the permission of the incumbent ￿rm, and administer the two drugs together in a clinical trial.2
The fact that an entering ￿rm bears the cost of clinical trials indicates that it expects positive
pro￿t. The cocktail￿ s impact on incumbents, however, is not clear a priori. Patients may prefer
having cocktail regimens because they provide more options for treatment, but if prices increase
substantially as a result, patients may be worse o⁄ with cocktails. Cocktail regimens allow ￿rms to
internalize partially the externalities their pricing strategies impose on competitors. Cocktails also
steal market share from existing regimens. If the former e⁄ect is larger than the latter, cocktails
render the market less competitive; if the latter e⁄ect is larger, cocktails increase competition.
We focus on the market for colorectal cancer chemotherapy drugs. We ￿rst estimate a
demand system at the regimen level using data on regimen prices, market shares, and attributes.3
Regimens, which can be a single drug or a cocktail of two or more drugs, are well de￿ned and stan-
dardized. Organizations such as the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) recommend
the amount of each drug that oncologists should use in each regimen, based on the dosages used
in clinical trials or in actual practice. A regimen price is a function of the price and quantity (or
dose) of each component drug used in the regimen. A cocktail regimen￿ s price is thus a⁄ected by
prices of all drugs used in the regimen, and a ￿rm whose drug is used in a cocktail regimen must
set a single drug price to maximize pro￿t across its stand-alone and cocktail products.
Market share is de￿ned as the proportion of chemotherapy patients treated with a particular
regimen. Data from randomized clinical trials provide information on attributes such as regimen
e¢ cacy (e.g., median number of months patients survived in the clinical trial) and side e⁄ects (e.g.,
the percent of patients in the clinical trial who experienced abdominal pain).
The demand estimates and a pro￿t maximization condition allow us to recover the marginal
cost of each drug. We analyze the economic e⁄ects of cocktails by performing a series of counter-
2Rather than modeling a ￿rm￿ s decision regarding whether and how to combine its product with other ￿rms￿
products, we take existing product combinations as given. Scott Morton (1999) is the only paper we are aware of
that models explicitly a pharmaceutical ￿rm￿ s decison of whether to enter a market, and she focuses on the subsequent
entry of generic ￿rms rather than the initial decision by the innovating ￿rm. She ￿nds that generic pharmaceutical
￿rms tend to enter markets that have supply and demand characteristics similar to the ￿rm￿ s portfolio of products.
3Our empirical approach allows us to study bundled pricing in an unrestrictive way. The existing bundling
literature assumes either that the utility of consuming a bundle is the sum of utilities of each product (independent
products) or that it is less than the sum (substitutes). Instead, we use data to measure directly the utility of each
product.
3factual exercises. First, we remove cocktail regimens one at a time and compute new equilibrium
prices. One underlying assumption is that drug-level marginal costs and patients￿preference re-
garding e¢ cacy and side e⁄ects do not change when a regimen is removed; regimen-level own- and
cross-price elasticities, however, do change. We ￿nd that pro￿ts of all ￿rms involved in that cocktail
decrease and consumer surplus increases when a cocktail is removed. Cocktail regimens increase
pro￿ts for an entrant as well as the incumbent, but harm consumers. This occurs because cocktail
regimens result in high drug prices; the e⁄ect of internalizing pricing externalities dominates the
business stealing e⁄ect in our application.
In the second counterfactual we compare the market with cocktails to markets with hypo-
thetical mergers between ￿rms that contribute to a cocktail. This allows us to assess how collusive
the market has become with cocktail regimens. We consider two merger scenarios. In the ￿rst
scenario we remove one cocktail regimen and allow the two participating ￿rms to merge instead.
We ￿nd that ￿rms can earn higher pro￿ts from having a cocktail regimen than from the merger.
In the second merger scenario we allow a pair of ￿rms to merge while maintaining their cocktail
regimen. The merging ￿rm has an incentive to increase prices to exploit its market power, but at
the same time it also has an incentive to lower prices to exploit a cocktail regimen￿ s complementar-
ity. We ￿nd that some hypothetical mergers result in higher prices and others in lower prices, but
the merger never increases pro￿ts substantially. Speci￿cally, a ￿rm￿ s pro￿t never increases by more
than 12 percent and in one case the merging ￿rm￿ s pro￿t actually falls. These results indicate that
cocktails facilitate almost as much collusion as mergers.
In the third counterfactual we allow a ￿rm to set two separate drug prices, one for its
stand-alone regimen and the other for its component drug in a cocktail regimen. This is equivalent
to a case where a ￿rm has two separate drugs, one used by itself and the other in a cocktail
regimen. Setting two prices introduces a new strategic incentive that we observe in other sectors
of the pharmaceutical market. In the early 2000s Abbott launched Kaletra, a drug for treating
HIV/AIDS. At the time Abbott was already selling Norvir, which was used in a cocktail regimen
to help boost the performance of its competitor￿ s drug. Shortly after the launch of Kaletra, Abbott
increased Norvir￿ s price four-fold while pricing Kaletra more competitively, presumably to drive
customers from the cocktail regimen to its new stand-alone regimen. Although we do not observe a
similar situation in the colorectal drug market, we use this exercise as an ￿out-of-sample" validation
4test for our static Nash pricing assumption. We ￿nd similar pricing behaviors in our counterfactual:
￿rms set the price of the cocktail component higher than the stand-alone drug when allowed this
￿ exibility.
In addition to the bundling literature, this paper is also related to the literature on the
determinants of pharmaceutical prices. Saha et. al. (2006), Frank and Salkever (1997), and
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) show how prices fall as generic ￿rms enter following the expiration
of a patent; Duggan and Scott Morton (2006) examine how Medicaid policy a⁄ects pharmaceutical
prices in the non-Medicaid market; and Duggan and Scott Morton (2010), Lichtenbeg and Sun
(2007), Ketcham and Simon (2008), Yin et. al. (2008), and Lakdawalla and Yin (2010) demonstrate
that the expansion of prescription drug insurance to Medicare bene￿ciaries caused pharmaceutical
prices to fall. Unlike the studies mentioned above, we use a demand model to analyze the welfare
e⁄ects of ￿rms￿pricing decisions, focusing on a sector where all chemotherapy options are substitutes
for one another. The model allows us to account explicitly for both the demand e⁄ects and the
competition e⁄ects of cocktail products.
In Section 2 we present an overview of colorectal cancer treatment and we describe the
data in Section 3. We present the model in Section 4 and simple numerical examples in Section 5
where two ￿rms each have a single stand-alone regimen and each contribute their drug to a third
cocktail regimen. Results from the demand estimation and counterfactual exercises are presented
in Section 6 and Section 7, respectively. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Overview of Colorectal Cancer
Colorectal cancer is the fourth most common cancer based on the number of newly-diagnosed
patients, after breast, prostate, and lung cancers. About one in 20 people born today is expected
to be diagnosed with colorectal cancer over their lifetime. The disease is treatable if it is detected
before it metastasizes, or spreads, to other areas of the body. Between 1999 and 2006, colorectal
cancer patients had a 65 percent chance of surviving for ￿ve years and a 58 percent chance of
surviving for 10 years (National Cancer Institute). The probability a patient will survive for ￿ve
years ranges from 90 percent for those diagnosed with Stage I cancer to 12 percent for those
5diagnosed with Stage IV (or metastatic) cancer.4
The way a colorectal cancer patient is treated depends on the stage of the tumor at di-
agnosis. Most patients with a Stage I, II, or III tumor will have the tumor removed surgically
(i.e., resected). The NCCN recommends that patients with Stage III disease receive six months of
chemotherapy following the resection; they do not recommend chemotherapy for Stage I patients;
and they encourage Stage II patients to discuss the bene￿ts and costs of with their oncologist before
deciding. The majority of patients diagnosed with Stage IV disease have an unresectable tumor.
Some of these patients receive chemotherapy to shrink the tumor such that it can be resected,
and many receive chemotherapy without prior surgical treatment. Our demand model examines
patients￿chemotherapy treatments choices once they have decided to receive chemotherapy; we
assume patients have already decided whether or not to receive surgery prior to chemotherapy
treatment.
Five major pharmaceutical ￿rms produced a patent-protected (or branded) colorectal can-
cer drug during our study period: P￿zer (which produced irinotecan), Roche (capecitabine), Sano￿
(oxaliplatin), ImClone (cetuximab), and Genentech (bevacizumab). There are 12 major treatment
regimens, half of which are cocktail regimens, composed of two or more branded drugs, and half
consist of a single branded drug. In one cocktail regimen, Roche￿ s capecitabine is combined with
P￿zer￿ s irinotecan. In another capecitabine is combined with Sano￿￿ s oxaliplatin. Genentech￿ s
bevacizumab is combined separately with oxaliplatin, irinotecan, and oxaliplaitin and capecitabine
to create three distinct cocktail regimens. Finally, ImClone￿ s cetuximab is combined with P￿zer￿ s
irinotecan.5
Three of the remaining six regimens are individual drugs used in the cocktail regimens
mentioned above, but in di⁄erent dosages. The other non-cocktail regimen are ￿ uourouracil com-
bined with leucovorin (5FU/LV), both of which are generic drugs; P￿zer￿ s irinotecan combined
with 5FU/LV; and Sano￿￿ s oxaliplatin combined with 5FU/LV. We take the generic drug￿ s price
as given and assume they are priced at marginal cost, not the result of ￿rms￿strategic pricing. We
therefore treat the last two regimens described above as being stand-alone regimens. The appendix
4Cancers are classi￿ed into four stages, with higher numbers indicating that the cancer has spread to the lymph
nodes (Stage III) or beyond its initial location (Stage IV).
5Some of the cocktail regimens also include generic drugs such as ￿ uorouracil and leucovorin, whose patents have
expired and are now produced by many ￿rms.
6provides a complete description of the recommended dosage of the 12 regimens for which we have
complete data.
The National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) divides colorectal cancer chemother-
apy regimens into two groups. For early-stage patients who cannot tolerate intensive therapy, it
recommends 5FU/LV (the generic regimen), Roche￿ s stand-alone regimen, or the P￿zer-Roche cock-
tail regimen. The other regimens are recommended for those who can tolerate the possible side
e⁄ects of intensive therapy. The NCCN also provides chemotherapy guidelines for patients whose
cancer progresses in spite of the ￿rst chemotherapy treatment. For example, if the Roche and Sano￿
cocktail regimen was selected for initial therapy, the NCCN recommends the P￿zer and ImClone
cocktail for second-line chemotherapy treatment. In Section 4 we use these guidelines to de￿ne the
nests for a nested logit demand model.
Most oncology drugs are infused into a patient intravenously in a physician￿ s o¢ ce or an
outpatient hospital clinic by a nurse under a physician￿ s supervision. Unlike drugs that are distrib-
uted through pharmacies, physicians (and some hospitals on behalf of their physicians) purchase
oncology drugs from wholesalers or distributors (who have previously purchased the drugs from
the manufacturers), store the drugs, and administer them as needed to their patients. Physicians
then bill the patient￿ s insurance company for an administration fee and the cost of the drug. In our
model we assume physicians are agents for their patients; we explain the details of the imperfect
agency in Section 4.
Because each drug is sold separately to physicians who then combine them (when relevant)
into a cocktail regimen, the only variable a ￿rm controls is the price of its own drug. This price,
in turn, a⁄ects the demand and pro￿ts of all cocktail regimens in which the drug appears. We
explicitly account for this impact in our supply-side (pricing) model in Section 4.
3 Data
We use several data sources to collect four types of information: drug prices, regimen market shares,
the quantity/dose of each drug typically used in a regimen, and regimen attributes from clinical
trials (e.g., the median number of months patients survived when taking the regimen in a phase
3 clinical trial). IMS Health collects information on the sales in dollars and the quantity of drugs
7purchased by 10 di⁄erent types of customers (e.g., hospitals, physician o¢ ces, retail pharmacies)
from wholesalers in each quarter from 1993 through the third quarter of 2005. Prices and quantities
are reported separately by National Drug Classi￿cation (NDC) code, which are unique for each ￿rm-
product-strength/dosage-package size. We calculate the average price paid per milligram of active
ingredient of a drug across the di⁄erent NDC codes for a particular drug. IMS Health reports the
invoice price a customer actually pays to a wholesaler, not the average wholesale price (AWP) that
is set by a manufacturer and often di⁄ers substantially from the true transaction price.
The price we calculate does not include any discounts or rebates a customer may receive
from a manufacturer after purchasing the product from the wholesaler. Based on interviews with
oncologists and an analysis reported in Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Town (2010), we do not believe
that manufacturers o⁄ered substantial rebates during this period.6 Although we have information
on 10 di⁄erent types of customers, we focus on the prices paid by the two largest customers -
hospitals and physician o¢ ces -because most colon cancer chemotherapy drugs are infused in a
physician￿ s o¢ ce or hospital clinic.7
We compute the price of each regimen for a representative patient who has a surface area
of 1.7 meters squared (Jacobson and Newhouse, 2006), weighs 80 kilograms, and is treated for
12 weeks. Regimen prices are derived by multiplying the average price per milligram of active
ingredient in a quarter by the recommended dosage of each drug in the regimen over a 12-week
period.8 The NCCN reports the typical amount of active ingredient used by physicians for the
major regimens.9 Dosage information is reported in the appendix. For example, the standard
dosage schedule for oxaliplatin+5FU/LV, the regimen with the second largest market share in
2005, is 85 milligrams (mg) of oxaliplatin per meter squared of a patient￿ s surface area infused on
the ￿rst day of treatment, followed by a 1,000 mg infusion of ￿ uourouracil (5FU) per meter squared
of surface area on the ￿rst and second treatment days, and a 200 mg infusion of leucovorin (LV) per
meter squared on the ￿rst and second treatment days. This process is repeated every two weeks.
6For the ￿ve patent-protected colorectal cancer drugs in our study, Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Town (2010) compared
prices that include discounts and rebates to the IMS prices that we use in this paper. They found that prices from the
two data sources were within two to four percent of one another, which is consistent with no or small rebates/discounts.
7Based on data from IMS Health, 59% of colorectal cancer drugs in the third quarter of 2005 were purchased by
physician o¢ ces and 28% by hospitals. The remainder was purchased by retail and mail order pharmacies, health
maintenance organizations, and long-term care facilities.
8The regimens are priced using price data for the contemporaneous quarter only.
9We supplement this where necessary with dosage information from drug package inserts, conference abstracts,
and journal articles.
8The IMS Health data contain information on market share by drug, but not market share for
combinations of drugs (regimens). We rely, therefore, on two di⁄erent sources for regimen-speci￿c
market shares, where market share is de￿ned as the proportion of colorectal cancer chemotherapy
patients treated with a particular regimen. IntrinsiQ collects monthly data from its oncology
clients on the types of chemotherapy drugs administered to patients. Based on these data, we
derive monthly market shares for each regimen between January 2002 and September 2005.
Since IntrinsiQ￿ s data only go back to 2002, we rely on the Surveillance Epidemiology and
End Results (SEER) data set for market shares for the 1993 to 2001 period. SEER tracks the
health and treatment of cancer patients over the age of 64 in states and cities covering 26 percent
of the United States population.10 Based on Medicare claims data available in SEER, we calculate
each colorectal cancer regimen￿ s market share in each quarter.11
In order to standardize market shares between the pre- and post-2002 periods, we take
advantage of the fact that the two data sets overlap for the four quarters of 2002. We apply a
regimen-speci￿c factor to adjust the pre-2002 market shares based on the ratio of total (from In-
trinsiQ) to Medicare-only (from SEER) market shares for the four quarters of 2002. The underlying
assumption in this adjustment is that the proportion of total patients represented by Medicare does
not vary over time.
All regimens we include in the sample contain drugs that were approved by the FDA for
colorectal cancer and had a market share greater than one percent at the end of the sample period.
The outside option includes o⁄-label drugs, regimens with less than one percent market share at
the end of the sample period, and regimens with missing attribute data.12
We plot market shares for the 12 regimens in the sample and the outside option in Figure 1.
Between 1993 and 1996, about 95 percent of colorectal cancer patients were treated with 5FU/LV,
a generic regimen, with the remainder treated with o⁄-label drugs or regimens with small market
share. In 1996 irinotecan was approved by the FDA for treating colorectal cancer, and over the
next several years the market share of irinotecan and irinotecan combined with 5FU/LV grew at
10SEER contains data on the incidence rate of cancer among the non-elderly, but only has medical claims available
for Medicare patients.
11According to IntrinsiQ￿ s data, approximately 48 percent of all colorectal cancer chemotherapy patients were 65
years or older in October 2003.
12O⁄-label use occurs when a physician treats a colorectal cancer patient with a drug that has not been approved
by the FDA explicitly for colorectal cancer.
9the expense of 5FU/LV.13 Capecitabine, a tablet that produces the same chemical response as
5FU/LV, was approved for treatment of colorectal cancer in April 2001 and was administered as a
stand-alone therapy or combined with irinotecan. Besides capecitabine, all other drugs for treating
colorectal cancer in our sample are delivered intravenously (i.e., by IV) under the supervision of a
physician or nurse.
Oxaliplatin was introduced in August 2002, followed by cetuximab and bevacizumab in
February 2004. By the third quarter of 2005, two of the regimens created by these three new drugs
(oxaliplatin + 5FU/LV and bevacizumab + oxaliplatin + 5FU/LV) surpassed the market share of
5FU/LV, whose share had fallen to about 14 percent.14
We obtain most of the attribute information from the FDA-approved package inserts that
accompany each drug. These inserts describe the performance of the drug/regimen in phase 3
clinical trials, including the number and types of patients enrolled in the trials, the health outcomes
for patients in the treatment and control groups, and the side e⁄ects experienced by these patients.
Often there are multiple observations for a regimen, either because a manufacturer conducted
separate trials of the same regimen, or because a regimen may have been used for the treatment
group in one clinical trial and the control group in a subsequent trial. In these cases we calculate
the mean attributes across the separate observations. Where necessary, we supplement the package
insert information with abstracts presented at oncology conferences and journal articles.
We summarize the attribute information in Table 1, taking a weighted (by market share)
average across regimens in each quarter and then averaging across quarters for each year. The
e¢ cacy and side e⁄ect attributes are time invariant while price can change each quarter. We
record three measures of a regimen￿ s e¢ cacy: the median number of months patients survive
after initiating therapy (Survival Months); the percentage of patients who experience a complete or
partial reduction in the size of their tumor (Response Rate); and the mean number of months (across
patients in the trial) before the cancer advanced to a more serious state (Time to Progression).
We also record the percentage of patients in phase 3 trials who experienced either a grade
3 or a grade 4 side e⁄ect for ￿ve separate conditions: abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting,
13Because it takes Medicare a while to code new drugs into their proper NDC code, a new drug will appear in the
outside option for several quarters.
14Drugs have brand names in addition to the generic names that we provide in the text. The brand names of
the ￿ve patent-protected drugs are as follows: Camptosar (irinotecan), Xeloda (capecitabine), Eloxatin (oxaliplatin),
Avastin (bevacizumab), and Erbitux (cetuximab).
10and neutropenia. Although many more side e⁄ects are recorded for most regimens, these ￿ve were
consistently recorded across the 12 regimens in the sample. Side e⁄ects are classi￿ed on a 1 to 4
scale, with grade 4 being the most severe. Higher values for the side e⁄ect attributes should be
associated with worse health outcomes although regimens that are relatively toxic are likely to be
both more e⁄ective and have more severe side e⁄ects.
This table demonstrates that there was a large price increase in 1998. The average regimen
price for a 12-week treatment cycle increased from about $50 to over $300. This jump is due to the
introduction of P￿zer￿ s irinotecan. Since then the average price continued to rise with signi￿cant
jumps in 2001 when Roche￿ s capecitabine was introduced, and in 2004 when bevacizumab and
cetuximab were launched.15 New regimens tend to be more e¢ cacious than the existing regimens,
with side e⁄ect pro￿les that are sometimes more and sometimes less severe than earlier regimens
(Lucarelli and Nicholson, 2008).
4 Model
4.1 Supply
We assume that ￿rms play a static Nash-Bertrand game with di⁄erentiated products. Because
drugs in our data set are protected by patents, the ￿rms have considerable market power. However,
physicians have multiple treatment alternatives, which puts the ￿rms in an oligopolistic competitive
environment. The price hike by Abbott in the AIDS drug market mentioned earlier provides
evidence that price is a crucial strategic variable in the pharmaceutical market. In the third
counterfactual exercise we show that our static Nash pricing is consistent with the AIDS market
case.
The prices of individual drugs do not show any common time trend consistent with dynamic
pricing, such as a below-marginal-cost pricing or intertemporal price discrimination. For example,
the price of irinotecan, the ￿rst patented colorectal cancer drug approved in 30 years, increased
steadily from $4.12 per milligram in 1998 to $6.40 in 2003, about a 10% increase annually, and
then dropped below ￿ve dollars in 2004 when ImClone and Genentech introduced new drugs. The
price of oxaliplatin, introduced in 2002, was stable around $16 per milligram for two years and then
15The price jump in 2000 is due to a market share increase of irinotecan+5FU/LV.
11dropped about 50 cents after 2004.
Nevertheless, price setting may not fully describe pharmaceutical ￿rms￿strategic behavior.
Marketing to physicians (i.e., detailing) is the most important non-price action. We do not observe
detailing activity and do not attempt to include it in the model. We also do not explicitly model
decisions by some pharmaceutical ￿rms to provide a rebate to certain physicians if their purchased
volume exceeds a certain threshold for the quarter or year. We are not aware of any study that
examines how physicians react to rebates, presumably because ￿rms do not disclose rebates. And
as mentioned above, discounts/rebates in the colorectal chemotherapy market appear to be small.
Although these features are not considered in the supply side model, we introduce a shock in the
demand model to capture physicians￿reaction to such supply-side decisions.
Let pf be the price ￿rm f charges for its drug/product. Consistent with our data, we
assume that each ￿rm produces only one drug, and therefore, pf is the only endogenous variable
in the ￿rm￿ s optimization problem. We denote mcf as the marginal cost for ￿rm f, and qf(p) the
quantity produced by ￿rm f. Pro￿ts for ￿rm f are
￿f = (pf ￿ mcf)qf(p);
where qf(p) is obtained by aggregating quantities across the regimens in which the ￿rm participates.









where sr(p) is the share of patients treated with regimen r, qrf is the dosage of the drug produced
by ￿rm f used in regimen r, and M is the market size. pR
k ; the price of regimen k; is determined
by pf and qrf: For example, if regimen 1 is ￿rm 1￿ s stand-alone regimen, pR
1 = q11p1; if regimen 3
is a cocktail regimen, comprised of drugs from ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2, pR
3 = q31p1 + q32p2:

















qrf = 0 (1)
12Equation (1) shows that a ￿rm will take into account the e⁄ect of its drug price on the overall
price of each regimen (@pR
k =@pf), and how changes in regimen prices impact the market shares of
all regimens in which a drug participates (@sr(p)=@pR
k ). The former e⁄ect is determined by the
quantity of a drug used in a recommended regimen ￿recipe;" the latter e⁄ect is determined by the
regimen￿ s price elasticity of demand, which we estimate using regimen-level data. We can recover
the marginal costs of each drug by re-writing equation (1) for these costs.
Equation (1) highlights that an analytical analysis is not straightforward. Consider the
simplest case where ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2 each sell a stand-alone regimen and there is one cocktail
regimen that combines the two ￿rms￿drugs. If all three regimens are substitutes for one another,
the pro￿t-maximizing ￿rst order condition for ￿rm 1 becomes
@￿1
@p1

































Note that while @pR
k =@pf is ￿xed by the recommended recipe (which was chosen years earlier when
structuring the clinical trial), @sr=@pR
k is a function of price unless one assumes a constant elasticity
demand. We rely, therefore, on numerical and empirical analyses to study the economic implications
of cocktail regimens.
4.2 Demand
We obtain our demand system by aggregating over a discrete choice model of physician behavior.
Following the Lancasterian tradition, products are assumed to be bundles of attributes, and prefer-
ences are represented as the utility derived from those attributes. A physician may choose a highly
e⁄ective regimen if a patient can tolerate side e⁄ects, or she may choose a less e⁄ective regimen
with more bearable side e⁄ects. We also include price as an attribute. It is not obvious physicians
pay attention to price because of health insurance. However, most Medicare patients pay about
20% of the treatment cost out of their pocket, most private insurance plans require patient cost
sharing, and private plans often have a lifetime maximum coverage limit. We also allow physicians
to observe regimen-speci￿c attributes beyond those we observe in the clinical trials, i.e., attributes
that physicians observe but we do not.
13Regimen attributes, no matter how many we control for, are not adequate to describe
physicians￿choices fully. Other factors such as patient conditions, detailing activities, and rebates
a⁄ect treatment choices as well. Because of data limitations, we summarize all these factors with
an idiosyncratic shock. We assume a physician draws an i.i.d. shock from the Type I Extreme
Value distribution every time she makes a choice, which makes our model a so-called logit demand
model. Thus, a physician choice is a probabilistic event, with regimen attributes determining the
probability.
The indirect utility of physician i over regimens j 2 f0;:::;Jtg at time (market) t is
characterized as
uijt = ￿￿pjt + ￿xj + ￿t + ￿￿jt + "ijt (3)
where pjt is the price of regimen j at time t, xj are observable regimen attributes such as e¢ cacy and
side e⁄ects, ￿t is the mean of unobserved attributes for each period, and ￿￿jt is the regimen speci￿c
deviation from ￿t. "ijt represents the idiosyncratic shock from Type I Extreme Value distribution
following McFadden (1981) and Berry (1994).
We estimate ￿t using quarterly indicator variables. ￿￿jt, which represents demand shocks
or regimen attributes that physicians observe but we do not, is likely to be correlated with price.
That is, price is endogenous as in most demand models. All terms other than "ijt represent
patient utility (e.g., patient co-payments, observed and unobserved attributes of the treatment);
"ijt captures any unobserved elements that a⁄ect a physician￿ s choice independent of patient utility.
The outside option (j = 0) includes o⁄-label colon cancer treatments, regimens with small market
shares, or regimens without a complete set of attributes. The utility of the outside options is set
to zero.
Market shares for each regimen j are de￿ned as
sjt =
exp(￿￿pjt + ￿xj + ￿t + ￿￿jt)
1 +
PJt
k=1 exp(￿￿pkt + ￿xk + ￿t + ￿￿kt)
This leads to the following demand equation
lnsjt ￿ lns0t = ￿￿pjt + ￿xj + ￿t + ￿￿jt: (4)
14Berry (1994) provides details of this derivation.
In this model all the individual-speci￿c heterogeneity is contained in the idiosyncratic shock
to preferences and, therefore, it su⁄ers from the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives
criticism.16 Berry and Pakes (2007) propose an alternative demand model that removes the idio-
syncratic shock from the indirect utility function and assign a random coe¢ cient to at least one
product attribute. In our pharmaceutical context, this pure characteristics model implies that
physicians are perfect agents for their patients and are not a⁄ected by detailing or rebates. The
pure characteristics model has a ￿local" substitution pattern, while the model with the idiosyncratic
shock has a global pattern.17 However, based on numerical simulations similar to those in Section
5, we conclude that the vertical model (the one-random-coe¢ cient-pure characteristics demand
model) does not correctly characterize the market with cocktail regimens.
Thus, as an alternative model we divide regimens into groups and estimate a nested logit
demand model. As mentioned in Section 2, the NCCA recommends 5FU/LV (the generic regimen),
Roche￿ s stand-alone regimen, and the P￿zer and Roche cocktail regimen for patients who cannot
tolerate intensive therapy and other regimens for less frail patients. Following this recommendation,
we form two regimen groups. In this model the degree of substitution within a group can di⁄er
from the degree of substitution across groups.18 Following Berry (1994); the nested logit demand
equation is
lnsjt ￿ lns0t = ￿￿pjt + ￿xj + ￿ lnsj=g + ￿t + ￿￿jt (5)
where lnsj=g is a regimen￿ s within-group market share.
5 Numerical Analysis
Before we apply models to the data, we examine cross-￿rm bundling numerically in the simplest
setting. In the benchmark case, ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2 sell one stand-alone regimen each without cross-
16Although we could alleviate this problem by allowing for random coe¢ cients on price and product attributes
following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), we are unlikely to identify the random coe¢ cients with our existing
data set. Usually one needs the consumer distribution from multiple markets as in Nevo (2000), or micro choice
data as in Petrin (2002). We, on the other hand, observe the same market over time and lack micro choice data on
physicians￿decisions.
17See Berry and Pakes (2007) and Song (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the di⁄erences between these two
models.
18When we allow for more groups, the estimation results are similar, as described in section 6.
15￿rm bundling (i.e., no cocktail regimen). The ￿rms compete a la Bertrand and consumer demand
is based on the utility function in equation (3). Assuming a price coe¢ cient of -1 and given product
quality, which we denote ￿j for j = 1 and 2, the ￿rms set price to maximize static pro￿ts.19 In the
empirical analysis we use actual market share data and observed regimen attributes to estimate
product quality and ￿x its value, but in the numerical analysis we change quality to study how
quality di⁄erentiation a⁄ects prices, pro￿t, and consumer surplus.
We introduce a cocktail regimen by allowing the two ￿rms to combine their drugs, given ￿1
and ￿2. We assume that this third regimen￿ s product quality, say ￿3, is the maximum of ￿1 and ￿2.
The cocktail regimen can be produced using di⁄erent combinations of the two drugs. Recall from
Section 4 that qrf is the dosage of a drug produced by ￿rm f used in regimen r. For simplicity
we set q11 = q22 = 1 such that pR
1 = p1 and pR
2 = p2: For the cocktail regimen we let r31 and
r32 be proportions of drugs 1 and 2 used in regimen 3 such that r31 + r32 = 1, 0 < r31 < 1, and
0 < r32 < 1: The price of regimen 3 will be determined by
pR
3 = r31p1 + r32p2:
We also allow r31 to vary in order to study its impact. The pro￿t-maximizing ￿rst order condition
is identical to equation (2) with q11 = q22 = 1 and q31 = r31: The marginal cost is assumed to be
one-tenth of the stand-alone regimen￿ s quality, i:e:; mcj = ￿j=10 for j = 1;2:
In our ￿rst numerical analysis we set r31 to be 0:5 and ￿1 to be 1; and allow ￿2 to change
from 1 to 3 so that the quality di⁄erence between regimens changes from 0 to 2. A new equilibrium is
computed for each value of ￿2. This simple exercise allows us to understand how a ￿rm￿ s behavior
changes as the di⁄erence in regimen quality increases. Figure 2 compares ￿rms￿pro￿t between
cases with the cocktail regimen versus the benchmark case (no cocktails). The x-axis measures
the quality di⁄erence between ￿rm 2￿ s stand-alone regimen and ￿rm 1￿ s stand-alone regimen, i:e:;
￿2 ￿ ￿1, and the y-axis measures pro￿t. Figure 2 demonstrates that the presence of the cocktail
regimen increases pro￿t for both ￿rms relative to not having a cocktail. Higher pro￿t occurs as
￿rms decide to charge higher prices with the presence of a cocktail regimen. This is similar to a
19Product quality is a linear function of observed and unobserved product attributes in equation (4), i.e. ￿j =
￿xj + ￿t + ￿￿jt:
16case where a ￿rm that produces multiple substitutes earns higher pro￿t by charging higher prices.20
An interesting di⁄erence is that the cocktail regimen serves a multi-product function for both ￿rms
at the same time.
Figure 2 also shows that as the quality di⁄erence widens, pro￿t increases faster for the low-
versus the high-quality ￿rm relative to the benchmark case with no cocktail regimen. This occurs
because the low-quality ￿rm ￿free-rides" on the relatively high quality provided by the cocktail
regimen. In the benchmark case the low-quality ￿rm decreases its price while the high-quality ￿rm
increases price as the quality di⁄erence widens. With the cocktail present, however, as the quality
di⁄erence widens the low-quality ￿rm increases its price to the point where the market share of its
stand-alone regimen becomes negligible. But the low-quality ￿rm still earns considerable pro￿ts
from the cocktail regimen. The high-quality ￿rm also increases its price, but not as substantially
as the low-quality ￿rm, so that it sells both its stand-alone regimen and the cocktail regimen.
Consumers experience o⁄setting e⁄ects. They bene￿t from having one more product avail-
able in the market but are hurt by the resulting higher prices. In our case the latter (negative)
e⁄ect is larger than the former (positive), so consumers are worse o⁄with the cocktail regimen, and
further worse o⁄ as the quality di⁄erence increases. Compared to the benchmark case, consumer
surplus is about 0.4 percent lower when ￿2 ￿￿1 = 0 and about 8.0 percent lower when ￿2 ￿￿1 = 2:
Whether consumer surplus falls, as it does in the above example, depends on how sensitive
consumers are to price. If ￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 0, consumers are better o⁄ with the cocktail regimen when
the price coe¢ cient is smaller (more negative) than -1.7. Prices with cocktails increase less and
consumers are hurt less when consumers are more price sensitive. Even with a moderate quality
di⁄erence, however, consumers are hurt by the cocktail regimen for a wide range of values for the
price coe¢ cient. When the price coe¢ cient is -2.5, the lowest value that sustains both ￿rms in the
market in the benchmark case, consumers are worse o⁄ with the cocktail regimen when ￿2 ￿ ￿1 is
larger than 0.2.
We next ask whether the two ￿rms can earn larger pro￿ts with a cocktail regimen or
by merging without participating in a cocktail regimen. Figure 3, which compares ￿rms￿pro￿ts
between the cocktail regimen case and the merger case, demonstrates that both ￿rms earn larger
pro￿ts with a cocktail regimen versus a merger. Firm 1￿ s pro￿t is about 20 percent higher when
20See Tirole (1998) p.70.
17￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 0; and the pro￿t di⁄erence (relative to a merger) grows as the quality gap widens. Firm
2￿ s pro￿t is also about 20 percent higher with the cocktail versus a merger when ￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 0;, but
the pro￿t di⁄erence decreases as the quality gap widens.
The ￿rms have higher demand for their products with the cocktail regimen, but they do
not lower their prices to attract consumers. In fact, the ￿rms charge higher prices with the cocktail
regimen than in the merger case once the quality di⁄erence becomes su¢ ciently large. Speci￿cally,
￿rm 2 charges a higher price as soon as ￿2￿￿1 exceeds 0.05, and ￿rm 1 charges a higher price when
￿2 ￿ ￿1 exceeds 0.5. Despite higher prices, consumer surplus is 29 to 36 percent higher with the
cocktail regimen and no merger versus a merger without the cocktail regimen, due to the bene￿t
of having another product available.
Interestingly, when we let the two ￿rms merge while allowing them to keep the cocktail
regimen, the merger provides small incremental bene￿ts. The merging ￿rm increases the prices
only marginally, and the combined pro￿t is less than one percent higher. This implies that ￿rms
almost fully internalize externalities with the cocktail regimen. As we elaborate in Section7.2, the
small incremental bene￿ts of merging occurs in part because the acquisition of a complementary
product creates an incentive for the newly-merged ￿rm to reduce prices. Thus, ￿rms may not
have a strong incentive to merge once they participate in a cocktail regimen, particularly if there
are transactions costs associated with merging. Consumers are clearly worse o⁄ with the merger
because the cocktail is available without the merger.
In the next numerical analysis we allow one of the two ￿rms to set two separate prices: one
for the stand-alone regimen and another for their drug in the cocktail regimen. This situation is
equivalent to a case where a ￿rm has two separate drugs, one used in a stand-alone regimen and
the other used in a cocktail regimen. We ￿rst let ￿rm 1, the low-quality ￿rm, to set two separate
prices while varying ￿2 from 1 to 3. Figure 4 compares the two prices that ￿rm 1 now sets versus
its single price from the ￿rst numerical analysis (Price1_Single). This ￿gure demonstrates that
the ￿rm sets a much lower price for the stand-alone regimen (Price1_Solo) than for the cocktail
regimen (Price1_Cocktail). Over the entire range of the quality di⁄erence, the former price is
about a 50 percent lower than the latter.
Compared to the baseline single price (Price1_Single) case, the ￿rm sets about a 14 percent
lower price for the stand-alone regimen and a 66 percent higher price for the cocktail regimen when
18￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 0. As the quality di⁄erence widens, the single price increases much faster than the other
two prices. Recall that with the single price, ￿rm 1 sacri￿ces its stand-alone regimen￿ s market
share as the quality gap increases and earns pro￿t mostly from the cocktail regimen. Now with
more ￿ exible pricing, the market share of ￿rm 1￿ s stand-alone regimen is larger than that of the
cocktail regimen, although it still free-rides on the cocktail regimen￿ s high quality by curbing the
price increase for its component of the cocktail regimen. (The unconstrained price is only 27
percent higher than the restricted price when ￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 2, as compared to 66 percent higher when
￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 0.)
Not surprisingly, ￿rm 1 is better o⁄ with the more ￿ exible pricing, while ￿rm 2 is worse
o⁄. Firm 2 now charges about 90 percent of what it used to charge. Firm 1￿ s pro￿t is about 6
percent higher than in the single pricing case, and pro￿t does not change much as the quality gap
widens. Firm 2￿ s pro￿t is about 12 percent lower in the ￿ exible pricing case when ￿2 ￿ ￿1 = 0 and
9 percent lower when ￿2 ￿￿1 = 2. However, ￿rm 2￿ s pro￿t is still higher than in the absence of the
cocktail regimen (the benchmark case.)
We next let ￿rm 2, the high quality ￿rm, set two separate prices. Firm 2 also sets a much
lower price for the stand-alone regime than for the cocktail regimen. However, both prices increase
as the quality di⁄erence widens. This price increase seems to reduce the ability of ￿rm 1 to free-
riding on the cocktail regimen￿ s high quality. As in the previous case, ￿rm 2 is better o⁄ with the
more ￿ exible pricing while ￿rm 1 is worse o⁄.
Finally, we ￿x ￿1 = 1 and ￿2 = 1; and let r31 change from 0.5 to 0.9. This exercise helps
us understand how the incentives to participate in making the cocktail regimen change when for
chemical and/or biological reasons, one ￿rm￿ s drug constitutes a higher percentage of the cocktail
recipe. We ￿nd, not surprisingly, that the pro￿t for ￿rm 1 increases as its mixture ratio increases,
and the reverse is true for ￿rm 2 as its mixture ratio decreases. Compared to the benchmark case,
￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t is always higher and ￿rm 2￿ s pro￿t is higher up to r31 = 0:8 and then becomes lower
beyond that point. We repeat this exercise by varying r32 from 0.5 to 0.9 while ￿xing ￿1 and ￿2
and obtain qualitatively same results.
196 Demand Estimation
We estimate equation (4) using regimen-level market share, price, and attribute data. The price
variable is likely to be correlated with the unobserved attributes or contemporaneous demand shock
because ￿rms observe them before setting prices. This price endogeneity problem requires using
instruments to consistently estimate the demand equation. We construct two instruments with the
lagged prices of other regimens. In particular, for the price of regimen j in period t, one instrument
is the average price in period t￿1 of all regimens other than regimen j, and the other is the average
price in period t ￿ 1 of regimens produced by ￿rms whose drugs are not used in regimen j.
Our identifying assumptions are that these instruments are uncorrelated with the current-
period demand shock, but are correlated with the current period price of regimen j. The latter
correlation should occur due to oligopolistic interactions and the evidence that the price of a given
product is usually autocorrelated. The former assumption requires that a demand shock for regimen
j in period t is uncorrelated with a demand shock for regimen k in period t ￿ 1, and is likely to
hold true. However, this condition could be violated if there exists a time-persistent market-level
demand shock.21
We use the generalized method of moments with (Z0Z)
￿1 as the weighting matrix, where
Z includes the instrumental variables, all the observed regimen attributes other than price and the
time dummy variables.22 The estimates are presented in Table 2. The ￿rst column reports the
results of the OLS logit model; the second column, labeled IV Logit, reports results using lagged
prices as instruments; and the third column, labeled Nested Logit I, reports results of the nested
logit with two regimen groups. The last column, labeled Nested Logit II, corresponds to the nested
logit where regimens for patients who can tolerate intensive therapy are again divided into two
groups (three regimen groups in total). In the two nested logit models we treat the within-group
share variable as an endogenous variable. In all speci￿cations we use the logarithm of price as a
regressor.
Comparing the price coe¢ cient from the ￿rst column with the other three reveals that
there is a positive correlation between price and the demand shock, and the instrumental variables
21We do not use other products￿attributes as instruments because they do not vary much over time due to infrequent
product entry and exit. The ￿rst stage F-statistics on joint signi￿cance of these instruments is less than ￿ve, and the
estimation results are not substantially di⁄erent from the OLS logit results that we present.
22Our sample size is not large enough to use the optimal weighting matrix.
20mitigate this problem. The price coe¢ cient changes from -0.690 without instruments (OLS Logit)
to -2.150 in IV Logit, and to -1.557 and -1.794 in two nested logit models. The price coe¢ cient is
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the one-percent level in all models. The F-statistic from the ￿rst
stage F-test for the joint signi￿cance of the instruments is over 10 in all three speci￿cations using
instruments for price. In the nested logit models, the coe¢ cient for the within-group share variable
is 0.403 and 0.421 for Nested Logit I and Nested Logit II respectively, and statistically signi￿cant.
This indicates that regimens are closer substitutes within a group than between groups.23 Allowing
for more nestings in Nested Logit II does not a⁄ect the results substantially.
The e¢ cacy attribute coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant in IV Logit and the nested
logit models, but only the response rate coe¢ cient is positive. Because these three variables are
correlated with one another, we evaluate preferences for a linear combination of the three e¢ cacy
variables. In the IV Logit model, the average willingness to pay for obtaining the mean e¢ cacy
from a 12-week treatment is about $70,000 in 2005. The average cost for that treatment in the
same year is about $18,000. The average willingness to pay for the mean e¢ cacy is slightly smaller
(by less than $3,000) in the nested logit models.
Among the side e⁄ect variables, only the neutropenia coe¢ cient is both statistically sig-
ni￿cant and negative as expected. The estimate implies that the average willingness to pay to
reduce a chance of having neutropenia by one percent is about $900. The other side e⁄ect variables
are either positive or insigni￿cant. This may occur because cancer patients often take drugs that
ameliorate the impact of certain side e⁄ects, such as pain, nausea, and diarrhea, while neutropenia
is fatal and harder to prevent with other drugs. If a physician prescribes anti-pain and antiemetic
drugs in conjunction with the chemotherapys drugs, she may downgrade the importance of these
side e⁄ects when choosing a regimen. Another possible explanation is that the toxic drugs are more
likely to cause side e⁄ects but have other favorable unmeasured attributes. Thus, it is important
to include these variables because, if left in the unobserved attribute term, they are likely to be
correlated with the e¢ cacy variables.24
23The ￿rst stage F-statistics reported for the nested logit models in Table 2 is for the within-group share variable.
24Estmation results do not change substantially with di⁄erent speci￿cations. In Table A-1 we report estimates of
alternative versions of the OLS and logit models, including versions without side e⁄ect variables and versions with
manufacturer ￿xed e⁄ects.
217 Counterfactual Exercises
With demand estimates we can recover the marginal cost of each drug using equation (1), and
given the marginal cost and demand estimates we can compute hypothetical equilibrium prices
under various counterfactual scenarios. We focus on the last six quarters of the sample period,
i.e., from the second quarter of 2004 to the third quarter of 2005. That is a period in which all
12 major regimens are present in the market. All results are averaged over these six quarters.25
In this Section we present results using the estimates reported in the second column of Table 2
(IV Logit). Results using the estimates in the third column (Nested Logit I) are also presented in
Tables A-2￿A-4.
7.1 Welfare E⁄ects
In the ￿rst counterfactual exercise we remove one cocktail regimen from the market at a time,
calculate the new Nash equilibrium prices for all branded drugs, estimate pro￿ts for all major
￿rms, and compute consumer surplus. This exercise is similar to the welfare counterfactual in
Petrin (2002). Because there are six cocktail regimens, we evaluate six hypothetical cases. The
results are reported in Table 3. The baseline reported in the ￿rst row, the situation actually
observed in the market, is normalized to 100. Therefore, the table allows one to observe percentage
changes in prices, pro￿ts, and consumer surplus when one particular cocktail regimen is removed
compared to the observed situation. The numbers in bold typeface are level changes for ￿rms that
participate in the removed regimen (which we refer to as "participating ￿rms" hereafter.) The rows
are ordered from the oldest to the most recent cocktail that entered the market, and the columns
are ordered from the earliest ￿rm that sold a cocktail at the left to the most recent at the right.
The ￿rst panel of the table reports the estimated price of each ￿rm￿ s drug, relative to the
baseline situation (100.0), when the particular regimen in a row is absent. For example, the ￿nal
row corresponds to a scenario where the Sano￿-Genentech cocktail regimen, which had the highest
market share of all regimens in 2005, is removed. Without this regimen, Sano￿and Genentech are
predicted to decrease their drug prices by 45.3 percent and 12.2 percent, respectively.
25Since we solve a system of non-linear equations, there may be multiple sets of solutions. In most cases we do
not encounter multiplicity with di⁄erent starting points. In the few situations with multiplicity, we select the single
equilibrium with the largest pro￿ts. See the following sections for more details.
22There are a few notable features of the ￿rst panel. In ￿ve out of six cases, prices of the
participating ￿rms￿drugs are predicted to fall when a regimen is removed, which indicates that
introducing a cocktail regimen is likely to increase participating ￿rms￿prices. Because price is a
strategic complement, prices of drugs not used in the removed regimen generally fall as well. Roche
is an exception; it consistently increases its price when other ￿rms￿cocktail regimens are removed.
In all ￿ve of these cases, the price of the incumbent ￿rm￿ s drug in the cocktail (i.e., the ￿rst ￿rm
in bold typeface in a row) is predicted to fall by more than the price of the entering ￿rm. This
indicates that when a new cocktail regimen is introduced, the incumbent may be increasing price
primarily to protect the market share of its stand-alone regimen.
The exceptions in the ￿rst panel, such as the predicted price increases in the second row
and Roche￿ s pricing reactions to other ￿rms￿cocktail regimen introductions, could result if the
structure of cross-￿rm bundling is more complicated than we are able to model. When a cocktail
regimen is removed in the numerical analysis, each ￿rm was allowed a single stand-alone regimen.
In the actual market, on the other hand, all drugs other than ImClone￿ s are used in three cocktail
regimens. When one cocktail regimen is removed, therefore, participating ￿rms will still consider
their other cocktail regimens when setting prices.26
The second panel of Table 3 reports estimated pro￿t once a particular regimen is removed.
No participating ￿rm is better o⁄ without a regimen. Pro￿t losses are sometimes substantial,
especially when the cocktail￿ s market share is much larger than that of a ￿rm￿ s stand-alone regimen.
ImClone￿ s pro￿t (second to last row), for example, is predicted to fall by over 80 percent if its
regimen, which has a market share three times larger than the market share of its stand-alone
regimen, is removed. Non-participating ￿rms are generally worse o⁄ too, although there are some
exceptions, such as Roche in the Sano￿-Genentech case and ImClone in the P￿zer-Genentech case.
We report consumer surplus in the ￿nal column of Table 3. The e⁄ect of removing a
regimen on consumer surplus is not clear a priori. Consumers are worse o⁄with one fewer available
product; but consumers bene￿t from the resulting lower prices. The demand model with an additive
logit error term allows variety to provide the maximum possible bene￿t. Table 3 demonstrates that
on net we predict that in ￿ve of the six cases consumers would be better o⁄ without the cocktail
26Roche￿ s pricing reaction shows that price can become a strategic substitute when ￿rms have a cocktail regimen
in common.
23regimens. All drug prices are predicted to increase when the P￿zer-Roche cocktail is removed, so
consumers clearly bene￿t with this cocktail. In general, consumer gains from the price decreases
tend to outweigh the losses from reduced variety.
The evidence on prices, pro￿ts and consumer welfare in Table 3 indicates that these par-
ticular cross-￿rm bundlings create a less competitive market that harms consumers. Firms setting
prices in the presence of cocktail regimens consider the demand for the cocktail regimen as well as
the demand for their stand-alone regimens. In doing so, ￿rms internalize part of the externalities
they impose on their competitors, which results in a less competitive outcome. This result leads to
our next question: if a cocktail regimen renders a market less competitive, how does a cocktail sce-
nario compare to a merger or perfect collusion? We answer this question in the next counterfactual
exercise.
7.2 Merger Analysis
Table 4 reports the joint pro￿t of the merging ￿rms and consumer surplus when di⁄erent pairs of
￿rms merge, where the two ￿rms￿joint pro￿t under the current situation (of o⁄ering the cocktail
regimen) is normalized to 100. For comparison, the joint pro￿t from the ￿rst counterfactual exercise
is reported in the second column, which is labeled Removed. The pro￿t loss can be as large as 49
percent when the Sano￿-Genentech regimen is removed.
In the column labeled Removed+Merger we report the joint pro￿t when the two ￿rms
merge without the cocktail regimen. Although the joint pro￿t in third column exceeds that of the
second because the two ￿rms have more market power, this pro￿t is not necessarily larger than the
current pro￿t with the cocktail regimen. In fact, in three of ￿ve cases the joint pro￿t of the merger
is smaller than the joint pro￿t with the cocktail regimen; ￿rms gain more from cocktail regimens
than from mergers.27 The di⁄erence is quite substantial; mergers are estimated to increase joint
pro￿t by less than 15 percent in these three cases whereas cocktail regimens increase pro￿t by at
least 30 percent.
In the column labeled Merger in Table 4 we report the joint pro￿t when two ￿rms merge
while maintaining their cocktail regimen. Interestingly, this joint pro￿t is not much higher than
the current joint pro￿t. The largest increase (10.2 percent) occurs when P￿zer and Roche merge.
27There are ￿ve instead of six cases in this counterfactual exercise because we do not model a three-￿rm merger.
24Compared to the pro￿t change from adding the cocktail regimen (column 1 - column 2), a merger
increases the joint pro￿t only marginally, con￿rming our ￿nding in Section 5.
In our counterfactual exercise the merging ￿rm does not always increase prices. In the
P￿zer-Roche and the Roche-Sano￿ mergers, the merging ￿rm raises both drugs￿prices as in the
numerical simulation. In the P￿zer-Genentech merger, on the other hand, the merged ￿rm reduces
Genentech￿ s drug price while raising P￿zer￿ s drug price. More interestingly, in the last two merger
cases the merging ￿rm reduces both drugs￿prices.
This mixed pricing result seems to be driven by a tension between complementary e⁄ects
and market power e⁄ects. Without complementarity a merging ￿rm always increases prices, but
because it now has a complement, the merging ￿rm has an incentive to reduce prices.28 Thus,
the merging ￿rm would not increase prices as much as it would without a complement and may
decrease prices if the complementary e⁄ects dominate.
The mixed pricing result also indicates that the merging ￿rm￿ s joint pro￿t is not always
higher than the current joint pro￿t.29 If the merging ￿rm reduces prices because of dominant
complementary e⁄ects, the other ￿rms￿prices, which are strategic complements, may go down as
well, which can hurt all ￿rms including the merging ￿rm. Although this does not occur in the last
two merger cases in Table 4, in Table A-3 we show that a merger can lead to reduced pro￿t when
P￿zer and ImClone merge with their cocktail regimen and we model demand with a nested logit.
In the scenario reported in Table A-3, the merging ￿rm￿ s joint pro￿t is about two percent lower
than the current joint pro￿t.30
As expected, consumer surplus decreases when ￿rms merge without the cocktail (going
from Removed to Removed+Merger) and increases when ￿rms add the cocktail regimen while
being merged (going from Removed+Merger to Merger), as displayed toward the right of Table 4.
In the former case consumer surplus falls as the market becomes less competitive; in the latter case
consumer surplus rises as another product is added to the choice set. However, consumer surplus
can change in either direction when two ￿rms o⁄ering a cocktail regimen are allowed to merge
28This is basically the same as a double marginalization problem with a complement.
29A merger is not always pro￿t enhancing in an oligopolistic setting. It is well known that in a symmetric three-￿rm
Cournot environment, a merger between any two ￿rms is not pro￿t enhancing. This is because the third ￿rm responds
to a merger by increasing its quantity.
30Consider a simple case with linear demand where two price-setting ￿rms independently sell perfect complements.
A merger between the two is not necessarily pro￿table if there is a third ￿rm selling a bundle of di⁄erentiated
complements.
25(going from Current to Merger). Since the number of regimens does not change, it depends solely
on how the ￿rms change prices after a merger.
7.3 Setting Two Prices
In our third counterfactual exercise we allow one of the participating ￿rms in a cocktail to set
two separate prices for the same drug: one for its stand-alone regimen and one for its drug in the
cocktail. This is the same exercise as the two-price setting case in Section 5. As mentioned, we use
this exercise as a validation test for our static Nash pricing assumption. Moreover, this exercise
sheds light on the welfare e⁄ects of Abbott￿ s pricing strategy in the HIV/AIDS market.
Table 5 reports price, pro￿t, and consumer surplus when ￿rms have pricing ￿ exibility,
where the baseline levels are indexed to 100. The column labeled Solo reports the optimal drug
prices for the stand-alone regimen and the numbers in bold typeface are prices for the drug used
in the cocktail regimen. In the second row, for example, we predict that P￿zer would reduce the
price of irinotecan by almost 60 percent for its stand-alone regimen while increasing the price of
irinotecan by 25 percent for use in its three cocktail regimens.
Table 5 shows that the drug price for cocktail regimens can go up dramatically with ad-
ditional price ￿ exibility. Roche increases its drug price for cocktail regimens by a factor of ￿ve
(in the fourth row) and Sano￿ does so by almost two times (in the ￿fth row). Drug prices for
the stand-alone regimens usually decrease substantially, ranging from 23.5 to 57.2 percent. A ￿rm
tries to attract consumers to its stand-alone regimen by charging a higher price for a drug used in
cocktails. The market share of the cocktail regimen in question a⁄ects the magnitude of the price
change. For example, ImClone changes prices moderately (the last row) because its cocktail regime
has a much larger market share than its stand-alone regime. The other ￿rms￿reaction to the new
price scheme is mixed. As one price rises and another decreases, some ￿rms respond more strongly
to the rising price and others to the decreasing price.
The second panel of the table demonstrates that ￿rms earn higher pro￿ts by setting two
prices in almost all cases, which is consistent with the numerical example. An exception is Sano￿,
whose pro￿t falls by ￿ve percent. This seems to be driven by a large price decrease by P￿zer and
Roche (24.4 and 29.7 percent, respectively), which harms all ￿rms.31 The ￿ exible pricing hurts the
31In the nested logit model all ￿rms are better o⁄ by this ￿ exible pricing. See Table A-4.
26other ￿rms, although the magnitude is usually relatively small. However, Table A-4 shows that
this is not always true. When Roche sets two prices, ImClone and Genentech are better o⁄ as well.
A di⁄erence is that in this case all other ￿rms raise their prices.
We report consumer surplus in the last panel of Table 5. Since the regimen qualities do not
change in this counterfactual, the only variable a⁄ecting consumer surplus is price. Consumers pay
a lower price for some regimens and a higher price for others. Thus, the net e⁄ect is determined
by the magnitude of price changes and regimens market shares. Consumer surplus is higher in all
cases, but Table A-4 shows an exception where consumer surplus is lower when Roche sets two
prices and we model demand with a nested logit. This is also a case where all ￿rms increase prices.
These results demonstrate that it is hard to predict the welfare e⁄ects of the ￿ exible pricing
scheme. Firm pro￿ts and consumer surplus may change in either direction depending on how ￿rms
react to the ￿ exible pricing. This suggests that Abbott￿ s pricing strategy with Norvir and Kaletra
is not necessarily detrimental to welfare. Nevertheless, the result that a ￿rm lowers a price for
a stand-alone regimen and raises a price for a drug used in cocktails is true in all models and
speci￿cations we investigate.
8 Conclusions
This paper is the ￿rst attempt to understand ￿rms￿decisions when their products are consumed in
conjunction with their competitors￿products. The ￿rm controls only the price of its own product,
and therefore needs to take into account the e⁄ect of its pricing strategy on all the bundles in which
its product appears.
We apply our framework to the pharmaceutical industry, in particular to colorectal can-
cer chemotherapy drugs. We estimate regimen-level demand using unique data from IntrinsiQ, and
perform a series of counterfactual exercises using estimates of the demand parameters and marginal
cost. First, we ￿nd that inter-￿rm combinations are likely to enhance pro￿t for all ￿rms participat-
ing in a product combination because the e⁄ect of internalizing pricing externalities dominates the
business-stealing e⁄ect. However, consumers are likely to be worse o⁄ with the combined products,
despite more variety, because they pay higher prices. In settings where consumers are less price
elastic, bundling may increase consumer welfare.
27We also ￿nd that ￿rms earn higher pro￿ts with product combinations than mergers. Even
if ￿rms that already have product combinations merge, the merger increases pro￿ts only marginally.
Interestingly, consumers are not necessarily worse o⁄ because the merged ￿rm may lower prices to
fully internalize the pricing externalities. These results suggest that the anti-competitive merger
e⁄ects would be smaller when the products of merging ￿rms are already consumed together in the
market, and should help the government evaluate the expected outcomes of the recent merger wave
in the pharmaceutical market.
In addition, we ￿nd that if a ￿rm is able to set two di⁄erent prices, one for its stand-
alone regimen and another for its component in a cocktail regimen ￿rather than a single price for
both products, it would set a much higher price for the cocktail component than the stand-alone
product. This result is consistent with what we observe in other sectors of the pharmaceutical
industry, such as Abbott￿ s pricing strategy with Norvir and Kaletra, and supports our static Nash
pricing assumption.
28References
[1] Berry, Steven T. 1994. ￿Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Di⁄erentiation." RAND
Journal of Economics, 25: 242-262.
[2] Berry, Steven T., James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes. 1995. ￿Automobile Prices in Market
Equilibrium." Econometrica, 63(4): 841-890.
[3] Berry, Steven T. and Ariel Pakes. 2007. ￿The Pure Characteristics Demand Model." Interna-
tional Economic Review, 48: 1193-1225.
[4] Blume-Kohout, Margaret E., and Neeraj Sood. 2008. ￿The Impact of Medicare Part D on
Pharmaceutical R&D." NBER Working Papers 13857.
[5] Bresnahan, Timothy F., Scott Stern, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 1997. ￿Market segmentation
and the sources of rents from innovation: personal computers in the late 1980s." RAND Journal
of Economics: 28, 17￿ 44.
[6] Carlton, Dennis W., and Michael Waldman. 2002. ￿The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve
and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries." Rand Journal of Economics, 33: 194￿ 220.
[7] Carlton, Dennis W., Joshua S. Gans, and Michael Waldman. 2007. ￿Why Tie a Product
Consumers Do Not Use?" NBER Working Paper 13339.
[8] Chen, Yongmin. 1997. ￿Equilibrium Product Bundling." Journal of Business, 70: 85￿ 103.
[9] Duggan, Mark, and Fiona Scott Morton. 2006. ￿The Distortionary E⁄ects of Government
Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing.￿Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121: 1-30.
[10] Duggan, Mark, and Fiona Scott Morton. 2010. ￿The E⁄ect of the Medicare Drug Bene￿t on
Pharmaceutical Prices and Utilization.", American Economic Review, 100: 590-607.
[11] Frank, Richard G., and David S. Salkever. 1997. ￿Generic Entry and Pricing of Pharmaceuti-
cals.￿Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(1): 75-90.
[12] Grabowski, Henry G., and John M. Vernon. 1992. ￿Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competi-
tion in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.￿Journal of Law and Economics,
35: 331-350.
[13] Jacobson, Mirielle, and Joseph P. Newhouse. 2006. ￿Does Reimbursement In￿ uence
Chemotherapy Treatment for Cancer Patients?￿Health A⁄airs, 25: 437-461.
[14] Ketcham, Jonathan, and Kosali Simon. 2008. ￿Medicare Part D￿ s E⁄ects on Eldely Drug Costs
and Utilization." American Journal of Managed Care, November: 14-22.
[15] Lakdawalla, Darius, and Wesley Yin. 2010. ￿Insurers￿Negotiating Leverage and the External
E⁄ects of Medicare Part D.￿NBER Working Paper 16251.
[16] Lichtenberg, Frank R., and S. X. Sun. 2007. ￿The Impact of Medicare Part D on Prescription
Drug Use by the Elderly." Health A⁄airs, 26(6): 1735-1744.
[17] Lucarelli, Claudio, and Sean Nicholson. 2008. ￿A Quality-Adjusted Price Index for Colon
Cancer Drugs.￿NBER Working Paper 15174.
29[18] Lucarelli, Claudio, Sean Nicholson, and Robert J. Town. 2010. ￿The E⁄ect of Physician Re-
imbursement on Chemotherapy Treatment Decisions and Patient Outcomes.￿Unpublished.
[19] McAfee, R. Preston, and Michael D. Whinston. 1989. ￿Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity
Bundling, and Correlation of Values." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 371￿ 383.
[20] McFadden, Daniel. 1981. ￿Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice." In Structural Analysis
of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, ed. Charles F. Manski and Daniel McFadden,
198-272. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
[21] Nalebu⁄, Barry J. 2004. ￿Bundling As an Entry Barrier." Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119: 159￿ 187.
[22] Nevo, Aviv. 2000. ￿Mergers with Di⁄erentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal
Industry." RAND Journal of Economics, 31: 395-421.
[23] Petrin, Amil. 2002. ￿Quantifying the Bene￿ts of New Products: The Case of the Minivan."
Journal of Political Economy, 110: 705-729.
[24] Saha, Atanu, Henry Grabowski, Howard Birnbaum, Paul Greenberg, and Oded Bizan. 2006.
￿Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Market.￿International Journal of the Eco-
nomics of Business, 13(1): 15-38.
[25] Scott Morton, Fiona. 1999. ￿Entry decisions in the generic pharmaceutical industry.￿RAND
Journal of Economics, 30: 421-440.
[26] Song, Minjae. 2007. ￿Measuring Consumer Welfare in the CPU Market: An Application of the
Pure Characteristics Demand Model." RAND Journal of Economics, 38: 429-446.
[27] Tirole, Jean. 1998. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[28] Town, Robert J. 2001. ￿The E⁄ects of HMO Mergers." Journal of Health Economics, 20:
733-753.
[29] Whinston, Michael D. 1990. ￿Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion." American Economic Review,
80: 837￿ 859.
[30] Yin, Wesley, James Zhang, Shawn Sun, and Caleb Alexander. 2008. ￿Impact of the Medicare
Part D Drug Bene￿t on Use of Generic Drugs and Di⁄erent Therapeutic Drug Classes.￿Journal
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 2: Demand Estimation Results
Variable OLS Logit IV Logit Nested Logit I Nested Logit II
log(price) -0.690￿ -2.150￿ -1.557￿ -1.794￿
(0.125) (0.483) (0.411) (0.412)
Survival (months) -0.087 -0.421￿ -0.323￿ -0.356￿
(0.056) (0.116) (0.093) (0.097)
Response Rate (%) 0.166￿ 0.913￿ 0.644￿ 0.784￿
(0.072) (0.254) (0.214) (0.215)
Time to Progression -0.335 -2.070￿ -1.395￿ -1.830￿
(months) (0.244) (0.644) (0.538) (0.545)
Diarrhea 0.024 0.072￿ 0.051￿ 0.052
(0.023) (0.034) (0.026) (0.030)
Nausea -0.137 -0.065 -0.059 -0.017
(0.078) (0.116) (0.082) (0.090)
Abdom_pain 0.135 0.806￿ 0.561￿ 0.681￿
(0.077) (0.229) (0.196) (0.193)
Vomiting 0.166 0.245 0.196 0.176
(0.118) (0.166) (0.116) (0.134)
Neutropenia -0.008 -0.109￿ -0.082￿ -0.098￿
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table A-1: Demand Estimation with Various Speci￿cations in the Logit Demand Model
Speci￿cation 1 Speci￿cation 2 Speci￿cation 3 Speci￿cation 4
Variable OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
log(price) -0.473￿ -0.690￿ -0.281￿ -1.210￿ -0.493￿ -1.290￿ -0.392￿ -1.606￿
(0.039) (0.064) (0.060) (0.302) (0.051) (0.218) (0.060) (0.437)
Response 0.025￿ 0.043￿ 0.043￿ 0.128￿ 0.074￿ 0.118￿
Rate (%) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.027) (0.010) (0.022)
Neutropenia 0.001 -0.011￿ -0.022￿ -0.111￿ -0.045￿ -0.131￿
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.026) (0.009) (0.035)
P￿zer -0.695￿ 2.730￿ -0.027 2.439￿ -0.515 4.293￿
(0.266) (1.213) (0.205) (0.743) (0.276) (1.827)
Roche -1.315￿ -0.063 -1.314￿ -1.621￿ -1.892￿ -1.577￿
(0.174) (0.485) (0.161) (0.219) (0.178) (0.233)
ImClone -0.988￿ 2.029￿ -1.252￿ 0.646
(0.333) (1.095) (0.304) (0.935)
Sano￿ -0.125 3.244￿ -0.948￿ 2.752
(0.298) (1.236) (0.300) (1.463)
Genentech -0.332 0.553 -1.255￿ -1.439￿
(0.241) (0.504) (0.246) (0.440)
R-square 0.819 0.862 0.875 0.899
1st Stage 80.204 8.231 14.828 5.782
F-statistics
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